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1 Introduction 
The book Expecting the unexpected: Exceptions in grammar, edited by 
Horst J. Simon and Heike Wiese2 fits into a series of collections of pa-
pers published in the last 10 years about metatheoretical issues in 
linguistics.3 These volumes have touched upon different methodolo-
gical problems related to the usability and treatment of linguistic 
data and evidence: their reliability, acceptability, functions, typology, 
structure, combinability, etc. A typical characteristic of the current 
literature on linguistic methodology is that most authors go beyond 
the standard view which has been dominant in linguistics since the 
1950s in several respects but remain within its boundaries in relation 
to other relevant issues. This is the case with the problem of inconsis-
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tency in general, and exceptions or counterexamples, in particular. 
The untenability of their standard treatment is realised and it is pro-
posed that "strong falsificationism" (that is, the rejection of a the-
ory/hypothesis which is in conflict with linguistic data) has to be re-
placed by "weak falsificationism" which allows for the temporary to-
lerance of counter-examples.4 This proposal, however, raises several 
problems to which no fully-fledged and generally accepted solution 
has yet been found. One problem is the question of how to interpret 
the idea of "weak falsification" in quantitative terms. That is, for 
example, it is not clear how many counter-examples refute a hy-
pothesised rule gained from the investigation of some corpus and how 
many exceptions can be tolerated. A second serious problem is that 
Chomsky's proposal for pursuing linguistics in a "Galilean style" 
(which is regarded by Penke and Rosenbach as a version of weak fal-
sificationism) retains the view that exceptions (and in general, incon-
sistencies) are failures. Nevertheless, they are no longer regarded as 
fatal but only as hindrances or difficulties which have to be overcome 
in future. This means in most cases that exceptions are put aside in 
the hope that later developments of the theory will solve them: 
Apparent counterexamples and unexplained phenomena should be carefully 
noted, but it is often rational to put them aside pending further study when 
principles of a certain degree of explanatory power are at stake. How to make 
such judgements is not at all obvious: there are no clear criteria for doing so. 
[…] But this contingency of rational inquiry should be no more disturbing in 
the study of language than it is in the natural sciences. (Chomsky 1980: 2) 
As the quotation witnesses, counterexamples are deemed by Chomsky 
to be foreign bodies in the actual phase of theory formation and have 
to be practically ignored for a shorter or longer time. According to this 
view, this neglect is all the more justified as exceptions are disturbing 
factors which may divert the process of linguistic theorising from its 
right direction. Some authors, however, go beyond this stance and 
indicate that inconsistencies should not be evaluated negatively; it 
should instead be acknowledged that they play a vital role in the 
development of theories. In this vein, Kepser & Reis (2005: 3) 
emphasise that contradictions resulting from the diversity of data 
may be fruitful because striving for their resolution plays a central 
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role in scientific progress.5 Similarly, it is illuminating to compare 
Chomsky's formulation on the one hand and Penke and Rosenbach's 
interpretation of its essence on the other: 
According to Chomsky it is legitimate to ignore certain data to gain a deeper 
understanding of the principles governing the system under investigation. [...] 
In all these cases, the apparent counter-evidence was not taken to refute a the-
ory, but stimulated further research that resulted in the discovery of principles 
so far unknown, thus enhancing our understanding of the phenomena under 
study. (Penke & Rosenbach 2004: 484; emphasis added) 
Against this background, it is clear that the volume Expecting the un-
expected: Exceptions in grammar makes a valuable contribution to the 
current methodological turn in linguistics. This is due to two 
circumstances. First, the reader finds an extraordinarily well-written 
essay about the concept and different methods of the treatment of 
exceptions in syntax; these insights can be easily generalised to 
linguistics in general. Second, most papers in the volume were 
produced by renowned theoretical linguists. This is in accord with a 
relatively new tendency in philosophy of science that metascientific-
methodological issues should not be dealt by imposing on specific 
branches of science practice-alien tenets stemming from general, ab-
stract philosophical considerations. Instead, philosophers of science 
"would have to work within science as actually practiced, and be able 
to discourse with practicing scientists about what was going on" 
(Machamer 2002: 9), or scientists have to be capable of reflecting on 
their scientific activities from a metatheoretical point of view. There-
fore, this collection of papers is well equipped to fulfil a double task: 
first, to describe and analyse the current practice of the treatment of 
exceptions in linguistics; and sec, to propose novel norms on the basis 
of which the recent practice can be evaluated. 
Nevertheless, the volume does not realise its full potential and 
does not live up to our expectations in some respects. This is mainly 
due to the circumstance that the contributions do not rely on the 
metatheoretical model provided in the second introductory essay but 
make use of their own, often unreflected concept of 'exception'. This 
leads to some perplexity at the conceptual level. Edith Moravcsik's 
                                                
5  "Evidence involving different domains of data will shed different, but altogether 
more, light on the issues under investigation, be it that the various findings 
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other, lead to factors of influence so far overlooked." (Kepser & Reis 2005: 3) 
 Csilla Rákosi 180 
definition and the conflict resolution techniques described by her 
could have been used as a starting point which would make it possible 
to systematize and compare the standpoints of the authors. As a 
second problem, most writers of the critical commentaries on the pa-
pers do not treat the contributions which they comment on as case 
studies about some aspect of the emergence and treatment of excep-
tions but react to them as they would to "regular" linguistic papers 
dealing with some object-scientific problem. A third problem is that 
the editors of the volume apply a structure whose parts are well-mo-
tivated in isolation but seem to be rather a mismatch together. In this 
way, highly relevant insights and perspectives remain unfocussed or 
at least, receive too little attention.  
Despite this, enlisting the participation of these authors is an im-
pressive accomplishment from the editors. Thus, the reader obtains a 
broad overview of the emergence and handling of exceptions in lin-
guistics. The systematisation and the elaboration of new methodolo-
gical rules relating to them, however, can be done in a do-it-yourself 
manner by the reader. Let us consider the "raw material" in some de-
tail. 
2 The contributions 
Edith Moravcsik's introductory paper offers the following definition of 
exceptions: "Typical exceptions are a small subclass of a class where 
this subclass is not otherwise definable." According to Moravcsik, 
exceptions pose two kinds of problems. First, they are in conflict with 
a generalisation which was supposed to hold for the whole class. 
Second, they do not possess common characteristics which would 
make it possible to define them as a subclass. Moreover, a third prob-
lem can be added which is a consequence of the first two: exceptions 
do not allow us to define the regular subclass, either.6 Therefore, it is 
not possible to simply narrow down the scope of the generalisation 
from the whole class to the regular subclass. 
Treatments of exceptions are divided into three main groups. So-
lutions belonging to the first group "represent exceptional structures 
as both exceptional and non-exceptional" (Moravcsik 2011: 35). This 
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posed to apply to the whole class; this is, however, only an "accidental" charac-
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means that exceptions are accommodated with the help of a repre-
sentation which interprets the given exception in such a way that ex-
ceptional and non-exceptional features are captured 
 
– as two faces of a single representation (double tree diagram); 
– as two strata in a single representation (the two tree structures 
are separated as two stages of the derivation of the sentence); 
– as separate representations in a single component (for example, 
underlying structure vs. surface structure), or  
– as separate representations in separate components (for example, 
syntactic representation vs. semantic representation).  
 
Solutions in the second group "regularise" the exceptions, that is, they 
re-analyse them in such a way that they become fully unexceptional. 
There are several methods of achieving this:  
 
– restoring the homogeneity of the whole class by re-analysing the 
regular and the irregular subclasses in such a way that there is 
no difference between them, or by re-analysing the exceptions so 
that the irregular subclass does not belong to the superclass; 
– strengthening the subclasses either quantitatively (that is, it is 
shown that there are no sporadic exceptions but a larger class of 
them which might allow for a principled explanation) or qualita-
tively (that is, further common properties are revealed which 
might make the exceptions predictable).  
 
Solutions in the third group are based on the strategy that the excep-
tional character of the members of the irregular subgroup is acknow-
ledged but one finds reasons which can explain them. Thus, one goes 
one step further than with solutions in the second group because 
besides revealing correlating properties, one provides an explanation 
for the exceptional behaviour of the members of the irregular sub-
group.  
Of course, on the basis of the analysis of further case studies, this 
typology can be refined and extended by other strategies. An arguable 
point seems to be, for example, the first strategy in the first group, 
because double tree diagrams do not require the separation of the 
contradictory descriptions of the same object. Therefore, this may lead 
to logical chaos, or, at least, it is not clear what could prevent the 
escalation of the application of such double representation in every 
case when a structure seems to be an exception to some syntactic 
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rule. Baltin (1987), for example, as Kertész & Rákosi (2009) have 
shown, flatly rejects the combination of two different structures into a 
single tree and seeks a solution which keeps both descriptions but 
separates them in a well-motivated way. 
From this concise overview it is clear that this typology is inti-
mately close to research practice in linguistics. There are no invented, 
only calculated possibilities which would follow solely from the syste-
maticity of the model but all of them are illustrated by real-life 
examples. Moreover, it shows that research practice in linguistics has 
departed from the standard treatment of exceptions: giving up the 
rule against which exceptions have been found is only one of several 
possibilities. In certain situations, one wants to keep both the rule 
(generalisation) and the exceptions; thus, one may separate the 
"regular" and "exceptional" characteristics of the members of the ir-
regular subclass from each other with the help of two distinct repre-
sentations. The application of this strategy results in a paraconsistent 
solution, that is, in a permanent but controlled toleration of the 
inconsistency based on a well-motivated and systematic separation of 
the conflicting representations.  
Treatments in the second group yield an important insight, too: it 
is not the linguistic examples themselves which should be regarded as 
data but their interpretation, analysis, or representation. From this it 
also follows that data are not sacrosanct, hard facts but revisable 
hypotheses which can be given up or modified.  
It is also a break with the standard treatment that all surveyed 
strategies require the modification and development of the given the-
ory at some point – that is, exceptions are not disturbing factors but 
the motors of the process of linguistic theorising. 
Barış Kabak and Irene Vogel give an overview of types and treat-
ment of exceptions in phonology. With the help of a case study on dis-
harmonic roots and atypical stress-patterns in Turkish, they compare 
some of them and raise a further one. Lexical prespecification repre-
sents exceptional phenomena with the minimal features necessary; 
thus, it employs maximal underspecification. This proposal seems to 
belong to the third group in Moravcsik's typology, that is, it offers an 
explanation of the exceptionality of certain phonological phenomena. 
Nevertheless, it motivates the extension of Moravcsik's typology from 
two points of view. First, Kabak and Vogel claim that it is not possible 
to find common features in the exceptional items. Second, the 
explanation which they provide does not identify the causes of the 
irregularities. Rather, the authors tried to propose a solution which is 
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capable of capturing the individual properties of the irregular forms 
by raising the idea of "the inclusion of item-specific information in a 
lexical representation" (Kabak & Vogel 2011: 77). That is, they try to 
solve a situation where there seems to be no hope for the "regu-
larisation" of the irregular subclass with the help of an explanation 
which could be labelled as "irregularising the superclass" or rather as 
"treating the irregular items to be the basis of the descriptive compo-
nent of the linguistic model". 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether "prespecification is the 
only descriptively adequate and theoretically viable means of hand-
ling various kinds of phonological exceptions" (Kabak & Vogel 2011: 
88). In order to avoid hasty generalisation, it would be interesting to 
scrutinise under what circumstances the proposed method is useable, 
better than its rivals, and what its limits or shortcomings are. 
Greville G. Corbett's contribution is thought-provoking because he 
defines exceptions not as isolated or unsystematic violations of a 
hypothesised rule but as deviations from a maximally regular "ca-
nonical system". A canonical system means that all possible combina-
tions of the relevant features are produced and it is examined wheth-
er all combinations are present in the given language and whether 
the combinations are maximally consistent, that is, there is a one-to-
one relation between feature sets and linguistic forms. This method 
enables us to reveal and characterise several different types of mor-
phological exceptionality (such as periphrasis, anti-periphrasis, defec-
tiveness, overdifferentation, suppletion, syncretism, heteroclisis, de-
ponency) and to detect cases when a linguistic form is exceptional 
from many points of view. Higher order exceptionality is especially in-
teresting because various kinds of interactions of non-canonicity can 
be investigated. Moreover, reliance upon canonical systems makes it 
possible to measure the amount of deviance from the (supposed) ideal. 
Nevertheless, one should not forget that this is only a kind of sympto-
matology: diverse manifestations of exceptionality can be revealed but 
this is only a first step towards a linguistic theory which might 
explain them. Despite this, it seems to be a very useful methodolo-
gical tool in morphology and typology:  
The canonical standard offers a point of reference, from which we can calibrate 
the real language examples we discover, and in particular those which are 
most relevant for morphological theory. Deviations from canonicity all demand 
an explanation, and instances of higher order exceptionality may well prove 
particularly significant. (Corbett 2011: 137)  
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Corbett's proposal is a particularly valuable contribution to the meth-
odology of linguistics because it is a tool with the help of which one 
can seek exceptions actively instead of simply registering them. This 
is, clearly, a fundamental breach with the standard view. 
Damaris Nübling's paper applies the third strategy, too, since she 
explains inflectional irregularities in Germanic languages in such a 
way that she tries to reveal the diachronic development of the verbs 
at issue. She identifies four different paths for the emergence of ex-
ceptions of this kind: accumulated sound shift, accelerated sound 
change, morphological change and lexical fusion, and remarks that 
exceptions can be often found under high token frequency. She re-
veals two factors which seem to exert influence on the position of ir-
regularity: semantic relevance and token frequency. She proposes to 
replace the term 'irregularity' by 'brevity' and 'distinctiveness', be-
cause "suppletion as the most extreme form of irregularity allows for 
brevity of expression without the risk of information loss (syncretism). 
Thus, irregularity must be understood as a protection against 
syncretism" (Nübling 2011: 157). She also emphasises that exceptions 
may produce distinctions which were not present in the given para-
digm. Therefore, Nübling does not deem inflectional irregularities to 
be simply exceptions to some rule or hypothesis but she thinks that 
they have a function within language. 
Thomas Wasow, T. Florian Jaeger and David M. Orr discuss an 
issue that belongs to the unsolved problems in the current literature 
on linguistic data and evidence: namely, the question of how to define 
the concept of 'exception' in the case of non-categorical (statistical) 
generalisations. The authors introduce the notion of 'soft exceptions', 
which means "a lexical item whose frequency is dramatically different 
from that of other lexical items that are similar in relevant respects" 
(Wasow et al. 2011: 176). This interpretation is somewhat shaky. 
Nevertheless, we may try to explicate "dramatically different" as 
"significantly different", and clarify what "in relevant respects" means 
in the given case – the latter seems to require a context-sensitive deci-
sion.The three authors demonstrate the workability of these ideas 
with the help of a case study about the choice of relativisers (that vs. 
wh-words) in the initial position of non-subject extracted relative 
clauses (NSRCs). The starting point of their argumentation is three 
tables showing that there is considerable variation in the rate of that 
in NSRCs depending on the choice of the NP determiner, head noun 
and prenominal adjective, respectively. They raise the hypothesis that 
the correlation between relativiser frequency and lexical choices can 
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be explained as the result of two factors. First, semantic and 
pragmatic reasons seem to influence the occurrence of certain deter-
miners, head nouns and adjectives with NSRCs. Second, there seems 
to be a link between the predictability of the NSRC and the absence of 
a relativiser because in the case of highly predictable NSRCs, a rela-
tiviser is less useful in the processing of the given utterance. To sum 
up, Wasow et al. provide a solution to these "soft exceptions" with the 
help of the third strategy of Moravcsik, that is, they provide an 
explanation for them. 
Jóhannes Gísli Jónsson and Thórhallur Eythórsson differentiate 
between two types of exceptions in connection with case selection in 
Insular Scandinavian: "structured exceptions, which display partial 
productivity" and "arbitrary exceptions, which are totally unproduc-
tive". Verbs with accusative subjects in Insular Scandinavian are 
structured exceptions in this sense. They not only show some produc-
tivity but also share certain lexical semantic properties. Thus, they 
can be divided into semantic subclasses. This indicates that they are 
treated with the help of the second strategy by Moravcsik, namely, 
the strengthening of the exceptional subclass qualitatively: their com-
mon properties are revealed which can make their use predictable. In 
contrast, verbs with genitive objects are labelled as arbitrary excep-
tions and handled with the help of the third strategy: a diachronic ex-
planation is provided for their behaviour. Here again, the explanation 
is related to exceptions as isolated irregular cases instead of a 
regularised ex-irregular subclass. 
Frederick J. Newmeyer analyses three approaches in connection 
with exceptions to typological generalisations in syntax. First, he 
characterises the Government-Binding Theory as a "macroparametric 
approach" which means that "the principles of UG are associated with 
a small number of broad-scope macroparameters, each of which 
admits to a small number of settings" (Newmeyer 2011: 258). Each 
setting of the set of parameters corresponds to a language. Against 
this background, typological exceptions were interpreted either with 
reference to markedness relations, or they were banished from the 
core grammar to the periphery. Newmeyer supports with several ar-
guments his claim that the attempt to grasp clusters of typological 
features with the help of abstract parameter settings failed. The 
second approach examined by Newmeyer is the Minimalist Program 
which he labels as "the microparametric approach" in which "pa-
rameter settings are not associated with principles of UG that hold 
for an entire language, but rather with particular functional projec-
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tions present or not present in a particular language" (Newmeyer 
2011: 265). This approach is judged to be unsuitable for the treatment 
of typological exceptionality by Newmeyer because it does not provide 
tools for formulating typological generalisations due to its focus on 
idiosyncratic properties of lexical items and their projections in single 
languages. To put it another way, Minimalism makes use of a high 
amount of language- and functional category-specific parameters; con-
sequently, typologically relevant common features cannot be grasped. 
The third approach to typological generalisations and exceptions 
investigated by Newmeyer is extrasyntactic: "the burden for handling 
both is shifted from UG to performance principles that are sensitive 
to grammatical structure" (Newmeyer 2011: 270). In this way, perfor-
mance-based explanations are provided for typological generalisations 
and their exceptions, an approach which resembles Moravcsik's third 
strategy. In this case, however, it is not only the exceptions that are 
explained with the help of reference to some other linguistic domain 
but the regular subclass, too. Newmeyer points to a fundamental dif-
ference between UG principles and performance principles: while the 
former does not allow counter-examples, with the latter exceptions 
can be expected and admitted – that is, individual violations do not 
refute them. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether "deviant" lan-
guages can be treated as exceptional individuals and left without ex-
planation: single individuals may behave "anomalously" but it is not 
clear why whole language communities do this. 
Sam Featherston surveys three types of exceptions: cases in which 
although phenomena appear to fulfil the conditions of the application 
of a rule, it seems the rule does not apply to them; languages which 
do not obey cross-linguistic generalisations; and corpus data contain-
ing a structure that is forbidden by some constraint.  
In a case study on supposed counter-examples against Binding 
Condition in German, Featherston argues for the application of "im-
proved data collection techniques" such as magnitude estimation 
methodology. He comes to the conclusion that  
Our experimentally obtained judgements demonstrate that the standard bind-
ing constraints apply here, but other irrelevant but nevertheless systematic 
constraints operating cumulatively […] are confusing the picture. There is in 
this data therefore no problem of generative grammar, no dilemma and no ex-
ception. The simple picture was being obscured by the large number of addi-
tional factors affecting these structures. (Featherston 2011: 299) 
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That is, in the case of exceptions of Type 1, Featherston proposes the 
application of Moravcsik's second strategy, namely, regularising ex-
ceptions with the help of restoring the superclass by showing that 
there is no difference between the supposed regular and irregular 
items. This is achieved through the radical revision of the data hand-
ling techniques of the theory. This proposal is, of course, in sharp 
contrast with the standard treatment of exceptions. 
Type 2 is exemplified by the presentation of the results of two ex-
periments. The first of them shows that generative linguistics mis-
judged German insofar as this language cannot be regarded as an ex-
ception to the Empty Category Principle. This experiment breaks 
with the assumption that well-formedness is dichotomous and is 
based on the hypothesis that it is of gradual character. Its results can 
be summarised as follows:  
The very close correspondence of the results on German and English leaves no 
doubt that the effect that we observed in German is of the same type as the 
superiority effect which we see in English. (Featherston 2011: 302) 
This is the same strategy that was applied to exceptions of Type 1: 
the regular and irregular distinction is shown to be only apparent and 
the two subclasses are unified. The alleged difference between En-
glish and German disappears because the difference between 
judgement scores relating to the two compared structures is not large 
enough to be interpreted as "well-formed" vs. "ill-formed" but there is 
a continuum from "better-formed", through "well-formed", and "ill-
formed" to "more ill-formed". This means that the re-interpretation of 
the regular and irregular subclasses relies not just on a richer and 
more refined data set but also on changes in the theoretical assump-
tions.  
Type 3 of "ghost" exceptions consists of occurrences of structures 
which are excluded by the grammar – and, the opposite may occur, 
too, when there cannot be found instances with structures that are 
relatively well-formed. In order to provide a solution for such prob-
lems, Featherston proposes the modification of the theory which 
makes it possible to explain the exceptions. This can be interpreted as 
the application of Moravcsik's third strategy – although this case 
seems to be a further subtype because it is various fundamental as-
sumptions about the structure of grammar which should be modified. 
Namely, the essence of Featherston's proposal is that  
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[…] an empirically adequate architecture of grammar requires us to distin-
guish two separate modules of the grammar: Constraint Application and Out-
put Selection. The first is responsible for the determination of well-formed-
ness, the second selects structures for output, operating competitively on the 
basis of well-formedness weightings. (Featherston 2011: 293) 
How does this account for exceptional occurrence? Well, to err is human and 
human linguistic behaviour is probabilistic. (Featherston 2011: 310) 
In Section 4, Featherston gives a brief but very interesting compari-
son of the inner architecture and treatment of exceptions in Genera-
tive Grammar, Optimality Theory and his own Decathlon Model.  
As Featherston himself emphasises, his proposals do not resolve all 
inconsistencies between data and hypotheses. Thus, it could be the 
task of further research to find out which exceptions cannot be solved 
in this way, and whether there are cases when there were no ex-
ceptions against a given rule according to generative grammar and 
the emergence of exceptions is a consequence of the use of the 
methods advanced by Featherston. 
Ralf Vogel addresses the issue of exceptionality in linguistics in the 
framework of Optimality Theory. As is well-known, OT assumes con-
straints to be violable; thus, exceptions are not counter-examples but 
only "soft", i.e. tolerable exceptions. Vogel chooses a highly instructive 
example, namely, case conflicts in German free relative constructions. 
These are cases when it is apparent that there is a conflict between 
two constraints: the wh-pronoun receives different case requirements 
from the matrix verb and from the verb in the relative clause.  
The first type of exceptions focused on by Vogel emerges from the 
circumstance that there are conflicts between linguistic forms and 
constraints which do not lead to ungrammaticality, while others do. 
OT introduces constraint hierarchies which enable us to grasp this 
difference: violations of lower ranked constraints can be tolerated in 
order to avoid the violation of higher ranked ones. This solution be-
longs to Type 1 according to Moravcsik: constraints and the optimal 
output form are separated. Nevertheless, this separation is context-
sensitive, that is, the tolerability of a constraint violation depends on 
the relationship between the given output form and other output-
candidates: only the optimal form is allowed to infringe the con-
straints.7 It must also be noted that although OT provides means for 
the toleration of constraint violations, there are other types of incon-
sistencies which it cannot handle, or, at least, for which it has no 
                                                
7  For more on this, see Darai & Rákosi (2011), Rákosi (in preparation). 
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built-in solutions. For example, the presence of structures requiring 
conflicting ranking hierarchies poses in certain cases a serious prob-
lem for OT.8  
The second type of exceptions dealt with by Vogel is variation 
among linguists. It is an everyday experience for all linguists that the 
acceptability judgements of native speakers and also linguists may 
differ from each other. OT grasps this phenomenon with the help of 
the concept 'variation': 
German might have three 'variants', German A, B, and C, respectively, which 
differ in their 'tolerance' of case conflicts. […] it might be the case that German 
speakers agree in the relative acceptability of the structures. The 'variants' 
only differ from each other in the tolerance of markedness. (Vogel 2011: 344; 
emphasis as in the original) 
Here there seems to be a strategy of regularising the exceptions by 
the qualitative strengthening of the irregular subclass at work. This 
solution does not provide an explanation of the existence of the three 
variants, since Vogel remarks that no dialectal or sociolectal factors 
can be found which could be deemed as the cause of these diver-
gences. Despite this, it provides theoretical tools which allow for their 
separation within the superclass. 
A third type of exceptions mentioned by Vogel (2011: 355ff.) is the 
situation when there is a conflict between the outcome of an ex-
periment and the results of corpus research. He resolves this conflict 
by making use of the third strategy, that is, he gives an explanation of 
the "deviant" behaviour of certain frequency values insofar as he 
reveals a confusing factor which should not be ignored during the in-
terpretation of the results of the corpus study.  
Frederik Fouvry's contribution approaches the problem of excep-
tions in linguistics from a computational linguistics point of view. 
Systems which use grammar implementations unavoidably face the 
problem that the system is not exhaustive, that is, there are utter-
ances which are acceptable to native speakers but cannot be grasped 
by the rules of the proposed grammar. Thus, it is of vital importance 
for the processing formalism that it can also give a minimal descrip-
tion or analysis of utterances to which its rules cannot be applied 
properly: 
                                                
8  See, for example, Kager (1999, Chapter 9). 
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Instead of modifying the grammar every time an exception is discovered, it is 
preferable to have a system that can deal with all cases as well as possible. It 
is however only feasible to develop such devices when the mechanisms with 
which the grammar is processed, are very strictly defined. The solutions are 
extensions to the standard, non-tolerant formalism, and are often formulated 
in a way that the non-tolerant functioning of the grammar is a special case of 
the extension. (Fouvry 2011: 381) 
Fouvry mentions four such methods: default rules, mal-rules, relaxa-
tion rules, and deeper modification of the formalism. Unfortunately, 
however, at this point this section seems to become incoherent: the 
reader cannot find the characterisation of the first and fourth method. 
Subsection 2.3.1 is followed by Sections 2.4-2.6, whose relationship to 
each other and to the previous subsections is not clarified. Section 3 
presents "generalised unification" which is based on not only on 
relaxing the rules also on the assignment of "penalties" to every re-
laxation both operations rely on type hierarchy. 
Michael Cysouw takes a highly thought-provoking perspective dif-
fering from that of the other contributors of the volume because his 
investigations do not aim at revealing how exceptions can be treated 
in linguistic theories but at finding out what exceptionality of lan-
guages means from a cross-linguistic perspective. He proposes to re-
place the concept of 'exceptionality' with 'rarity' which is then inter-
preted and compared against the background of the World Atlas of 
Language Structures by Haspelmath et al. The basis for the compari-
son of rarity is the "rarity index": 
The basic idea behind the rarity index is to compute the chance of occurrence 
for all characteristics of a particular language, and then take the mean over all 
these chances of occurrence. In essence, this results in an average rarity for a 
language. (Cysouw 2011: 414) 
Rarity indices can be determined for single languages and for groups 
of languages as well, and their areal distribution can be surveyed, too. 
Cysouw provides some interesting examples for all of them, and 
shows that languages in north-western Europe cannot be regarded as 
"paradigmatic" or "normal" languages against which all deviations 
could be labelled to be exceptions. Instead, as his calculations clearly 
indicate, north-western Europe belongs to "the geographical areas 
with a high level of rarity": English, German, Dutch, Frisian and 
French are highly exceptional. 
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3 Summary 
To sum up, this volume provides an excellent starting point for a 
comprehensive discussion about types and treatment of exceptions in 
linguistics. Nevertheless, there is room for further development of the 
ideas raised, for example, along the following lines:  
 
– How comprehensive is the picture which the volume gives about 
the issue of exceptions in linguistics? 
– Under what circumstances can the proposed methods be made 
use of and what are the limits of their application? 
– How can the metascientific reflection on exceptions be further de-
veloped?  
 
The last question seems to be especially important because there are 
several authors among the contributors who still heavily rely on the 
terminology and the elements of the standard view of linguistic data 
and evidence by speaking of "facts", "observation", "falsification" or 
"truth" in connection with data. Therefore, from this point of view, the 
book Expecting the unexpected: Exceptions in grammar is not excep-
tional. It is characterised by the same kind of double-facedness as all 
other current collections of papers related to metatheoretical issues in 
linguistics. Many (but not all) contributions mix up elements which 
clearly break with the standard view of the analytical philosophy of 
science and the standard view of linguistic data and evidence and 
develop new ideas and methods on the one hand and views which 
remain within the latter's boundaries and lead to more or less appar-
ent inconsistencies with the former. 
Despite this, it should be clear that the first steps towards a new 
methodology of the treatment of exceptions have been taken. It would 
be extremely useful to reveal, collect and systematise the strategies 
adopted to treat exceptions in linguistics. Such inventories would 
never, of course, be complete and never unanimously accepted. But 
they could provide methodological guidelines and tool kits for lin-
guists and students of linguistics. Their richness and divergences 
could prevent researchers from making use always and as a matter of 
routine of one and the same method.  
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